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L futroduction
A. The purpose of this paper is to use very standard analytic tools to

challenge deeply held beliefs about the nature of interest group
participation in public land politics.
1. "Public lands planning and decision making" is politics: who gets

to participate, who gets to frame the debate, who controls the language of
legitimacy, who pays, who benefits.
2. futerest group participation in public lands politics is far more
textured and interesting than the dominant notion of "capture" suggests.
(See, for example, Foss, Politics and Grass, 1960).
3. The durable conflict of public lands politics is best understood in
terms described by Hays as locally defined aspirations and democratic
processes versus the requirements of a centralized, national technical
society. There are two components to this durable issue:
a. central/local
b. technical elite/participatory
4. Use shifting patterns of advocacy described by Kaufman to
suggest that the Progressive Era coalition of interests is trying to reassert

itself. That appears to be working; however, the world is sufficiently
altered to suggest that the coalition will not work as it did before. The
fundamental tensions which Hays identified continue nonetheless to defme
the turf in which interest groups contend.
B. The paper has four sections.
1. The second section presents the deeply held beliefs in a
convenient carry-all, a critique of the standard acquisition-dispositionretention triptych that colors, and I have come to believe, poisons most
thinking about public lands.
a. Regarding interest group participation, the intellectual
structure mis-identifies and conceals participants, foci of advocacy, modes
of resolution, and goals.
b. This partial view makes it difficult to understand what did
happen and, since public lands advocates and the attentive public's
understanding of public lands issues are peculiarly likely to be driven by
tales of ancient struggles, what is happening and what will happen.
2. The third section presents two very familiar tools of analysis
from classic scholars who shed light on the peculiar eddys and backwaters
of public lands scholarship. It provides some simple guidance for
transcending what is obviously nonsense in our mythology.
a. Samuel P. Hay's Conservation and the Gospel of Efficiency
(1959) puts the progressive era tale of good guy's struggle against land
grabbers and robber barons into the context of the rise of science.
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b. Herbert Kaufman ("Emerging Conflicts in the Doctrines of
Public Administration," 50 APSR 1057 [1956]) puts the rise of science into
the context of competing values in the American system of public
bureaucracies.
c. Kaufman's analysis very easily transforms into a cycle which,
perforce, has predictive potential which can help explain where we are and
where we are heading. (See Kaufman, "Administrative Decentralization
and Political Power," January-Febuary 1969 PAR [1969]).
3. The elaboration in the fourth section pokes these analytical tools
in the general direction of my assigned topic.
a. Standard discussions of interest groups in public lands policy
culminate in a tedious and unfruitful preoccupation with "captured"
bureaucracies.
b. This is an unnecessarily impoverished discussion.
c. A richer tale is woven from a longer sweep of history.
d. We see the standard central/technical vs local/participatory
dyads torquing around on various ases, but the basic questions remain.
II. The Myths
A. Analyzing myths is tricky, but very much in fashion. I turu for
guidance to William Cronon ("A Place for Stories: Nature, History and
Narrative." 78 J. American History 1345 [1992]): how does a story begin,
end, and what is its direction? .
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B. Most of our mythology can connected with the standard acquisitiondisposition-retention model of public lands history and policy. (The
format probably originated, in a necessarily abbreviated form in
Donaldson, The Public Domain: Its History with Statistics [1881]. For
reference to a fully elaborated relatively recent version see Culhane, Public
Lands Politics, 1981, at 41).

1. That configuration contains a teleology and a standard cast of
characters which badly misconstrue who was participating and what was at
issue. Because the story serves the interests of the dominant group it
continues to be shared and continues to miseducate regarding those basics.
a. Begins: with the waste, pillage, and plunder of the 19th
century disposition era, dominated by local bad guys.
b. Ends: with the onset of land retention, and the technical
participation of the federal government.
c. Direction: from bad waste and disposition to good federal
scientific management.
d. The narrative concerns the struggle between the good
conservationists and the evil, selfish, rapacious industry which is resolved
when science--in the form of the federal government--emerges to trump
politics and bring wisdom to resource issues.
C. What is interesting about this in terms of interest group
participation?

1. The story does not begin where the time line does.
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a. Most analysts until very recently have glossed over acquisition.
It is standard, for example, to assert that acquisition began in 1803. (See

Coggins, Wilkinson, and Leshy, Federal Public Land and Resources Law,
3d Ed, 1993, at 45).
b. This further inscribes the federalness of federal lands.
Leaving out state cessions, the General Land Ordnances of 1785 and 1787,
and the understandings regarding the public domain that dominated our
first century gives the federalness of the format an air of preordained and
unchallenged naturalness. (See Abernathy, Western Lands and the
American Revolution [1937] and, more generally Jensen, The Articles of
Confederation [1940]. See also, Onuf, "Toward Federalism: Virginia,

Congress, and the Western Lands," 34 William and Mary Quarterly Series
3,353 [1977] and Onuf, Statehood and Union: A History of the Northwest
Ordinance [1992]). State, local, and private interests are, in this distorted

context, a surprise or illegitimate.
2. The shift from pillage and plunder in the 19th Century to wise
federal management in the 20th emerges as teleological. The centrality of
federalness noted in point b is exacerbated. (See Udall, The Quite Crisis,
Chapter Five, for a better than average standard rendition.)
a. The focus on federalness clouds the crucial and continuing role
of states and localities in both the political process surrounding public lands
management, and in the actual management of the lands themselves.
b. The focus on federalness also clouds the important role, again
as participants and managers, of private parties, principally lessees.
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c. The supporters of conservation are badly miscast: industry is
not merely a "bad guy" but an opponent of conservation which is
demonstrably incorrect. Interests supporting conservation are portrayed as
good guys, but also, more obviously incorrectly, as the common man.
(For some insight into how this distortion took root into the literature, see
Fairfax and Tarlock, "No Water for the Woods," 15 Idaho Law Review
509 [1979], 534,35.)
d. The story mis-casts the opposing side. In successfully
dismissing conservation opponents as selfish bad guys, it also dismissed
fundamental questions of distributional equity, which issues continue to be
underaddressed in current environmental advocacy, democratic process and
participation.
e. With all this miscasting of participants and issues, it is difficult
to see the dynamics of interest group participation, which I argue, is a
constant shifting of alliances around the central-local and technicalparticipatory framework.

ill. The Analytic Tools

A. Politics and the Constitution. It is sometimes necessary to call the
water to the attention of the fish. Interest group activity is defmed by the
structure of politics.

6

1. Far more than Articles I and IV, the basic structure of
government shapes public lands issues and interest group participation
therein. The classic reference here is, of course, Weschler, "The Political
Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the States in the Composition and
Selection of the National Government," 54 Columbia Law Rev. 543
[1954]).
2. Few issue areas are more fundamentally defined by the structure
of government established, the federal system of state and national
governments, and the particular manifestation of thereof in the structuring
of the federal Congress into House and Senate. The central/local issues
preordained by this structure--and which indeed played a central role in
defining it--are immediately and continuously apparent in the public lands
context.
B. The Rise of Science. In public lands politics, the most important

addition to that political structure is the rise of non-partisan technical
competence as the core value in newly emergent late 19th century public
bureaucracies.

1. Samuel P. Hays' contribution is to unwrap the Progressive Era
conservation movement from its rhetorical and historical focus on land
grabbing, land holding, and monopolies, and portray it more fruitfully as
an embrace of science. (Conservation and the Gospel of Efficiency, 1959).
The first American conservation movement experimented with the
application of the new technology to resource management.
Requiring centralized and coordinated decisions, however, this
procedure conflicted with American political institutions which drew
their vitality from filling local needs .... Instead of recognizing the
paradoxes which their own approach raised, conservationists choose
merely to identify their opposition as "selfish interests." Yet the

7

conservation movement raised a fundamental question in American
life: How can large-scale economic development be effective and at
the same time fulfill the desire for significant grass-roots
participation? How can the teclmical requirements of an increasingly
complex society be adjusted to the need for the expression of partial
and limited aims? This was the basic political problem which a
teclmological age, the spirit of which the conservation movement
fully embodied, bequeathed to American society. (275-76).
2. The fundamental tension is between local, participatory decision
making and centralized, teclmically based decision making.
3. The caricature of "local selfish interests" highlights the
progressive's fundamental lack of interest in distributional effects: (Note
for contrast: "For progressivism, poverty in the context of fisheries results
from the irrationality of open access and the attendant economic waste
produced by a bio-economic tragedy. But the essence of persistent poverty
is its spatial dimension. Specifically, poverty is manifest at the micro level
of the household and the community. In contrast, the decision logic of
progressivism operates at the macro level of the national economy pursuing
ageographical "efficiency" gains.": Macinko, "Property, Crises and Place:
The Meaning of Theory" PhD. Dissertation in progress, 4-21).

C. The rise of science in context: Herbert Kaufman's analysis of
shifting value priorities in public administration. (See "Emerging Conflicts
in the Doctrines of Public Administration," APSR 1057 [1956]).
1. Kaufman provides the essential connection between the early days
of public domain policy and the conservation era described by Hayes, the
present, and the future. Kaufman asks: What Do We as a People Want
From a Bureaucracy? He answers that the dominant value has changed
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over time. Problems with each dominant value have led to the emergence
of another theme
a. Representativeness: the bureaucracy should be representative
of the people. Presidency of Andrew Jackson; Long ballots (we elected an
enormous number of public officials); the spoils system (elected officials
brought in their political supporters). The problem is corruption,
diversion of public goods to the managers.
b. Non-partisan technical competence: technically trained
experts hired as bureaucratic decision makers will insulate decision making
from politics and people. The Pendleton Act (Civil Service) of 1883:
bureaucrats would be hired, promoted on the basis of merit; the
Progressive Era; Teddy Roosevelt's administration; Independent boards,
agencies, and panels of experts will make the key decisions outside of the
normal pull and haul of partisan politics. The problem is fragmentation,
and a demise of leadership. Neutral competence undercut the executive's
ability to lead.
c. Executive leadership: organize govermnent so that leadership
is possible. The rise of executive budget; proliferation of Hoover
Commissions, executive reorganizations.
2. Timeline as Cycle. Kaufman after all did write in 1956, the full
Aristotelian flavor of his insights are found when recasting it as a cycle
which, perforce, has predictive potential.
a. Return to public representation via public involvement. The
second environmental movement--somewhere between 1955 and 1980-marks a return to representativeness. (See Stewart, "The Reformation of
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American Administrative Law" 88 Harvard Law Rev. 1669 [1975]; see
also, Kaufman, [1979]).
b. The latest switch: a return to science?
IV. The Elaboration-A. Standard recent discussions of interest groups participation in public

lands policy reflects, appropriately, applications of group theories of
politics (beginning with Bentley, The Process a/Government [1908] and
Truman, The Governmental Process [1951]) applied with specific reference
to federal agencies. The basic notion is that government decisions are the
result of interest group interactions. Many tedious disciplinary issues and
evolutions boil down to an overwhelming preoccupation with the issue of
"capture"--an agency's agenda is controlled by its constituency. Almost
painlessly captured in Culhane, Public Lands Politics [1981] 22-27.)
1. The standard capture tales, for those who may have missed them
are Selznick, IVA and the Grass Roots [1949] and Foss, Politics and Grass
[1960]. Foss's discussion is unnecessarily impoverished, underdiscussed as
a tautology--he only looked at grazing issues and he found that livestock
interests dominated the Bureau of Land Management. A more textured
discussion is Calef, Public Grazing, Private Lands [1960].
2. The capture tales are not inconsistent with the framework I am
constructing. They are right out of the triptych mythology discussed
above, portraying the contesting parties in predictable fashion: good
conservationists, bad industry.
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a. Note for example, that although a reasonable hypothesis is that
the National Park Service has at least as monochromatic and controlling a
constituency as the Bureau ever did (and certainly does not have now), NPS
has not been widely recognized or analyzed as a captured agency.
b. Note also that the capture stories are different from the tum
of the century mystic: the federal government is no longer a clear good
guy. Note, however, that this is not a rethinking of the benefits of
centralization, bureaucracy, imperialism, and technology. The Feds have
simply gone over to/been taken over by the bad guys. To this we shall
return.
3. A richer tale is woven in a far longer sweep of history. To show
that my basic structure here is solid, I would have to present 19th century
public lands policy in terms interest groups contending on issues of local
versus central control. A persuasive tale might include land speculators
jockeying for position around the revolution, the Articles, and the
Constitution (see Abernathy, Western Lands and the American Revolution,
[1937] and Onuf, Statehood and Union: A History of the Northwest
Ordinance [1992]); grants for internal improvements opposed by the

"common blood, sword, and purse" argument ( See Fairfax, "Federalism as
if States Mattered: Resource Revenues and the Public Lands." [1986] and
Donaldson, The Public Domain: Its History with Statistics [1881]); and,
most interestingly, the rise of resource revenue sharing as a quid pro quo
in western acceptance of federal retention and management of public lands
Fairfax, "Federalism as if States Mattered: Resource Revenues and the
Public Lands." [1986].
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4. The progressive era is too well documented, in specifically Hays
and Kaufman's terms, to require much elaboration.
5. A more interesting effort is to view interest group participation
in the context of Kaufman's return to representativeness.
1. The return to representativeness, albeit significantly modified,

suggests that the nation's embrace of science as the basis of decision making
and legitimacy had ended.
2. But it was different--Iess electoral, and arguably, therefore, far
less democratic.
a. Public interest groups became directly involved in deliberative
process of executive agencies. The rise of the planning process is at least in
part a reflection of a renewed emphasis on representativeness inherent in
the public involvement phase of the late 1960s and 1970s.
b. And, when the results did not satisfy, they became involved
through the courts. (Sax, Defending the Environment. [1971], Ch. 5).
3. The modem environmental movement, beginning in about 1955,
evinces an awkward straddle regarding the fundamental progressive era
tenets.
1. Consistently centrist, centralizing.

2. Consistently if not completely openly elitist. (See Sax, Mountains
Without Handrails).

But also, notably anti-science.

3. Awkwardly inconsistent on federal management agencies.
a. Clearcutting and capture vs Sagebrush Rebellion.
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D. Things seem in a bit of a hash--perbaps we need a new paradigm?
1. Popper: Thus at the heart of the nation's public land policy one

frods a conceptual and operational void. It has existed for at least three
generations ... nearly all contemporary discussion of the lands seems
stagnant, unable to move beyond ideas that were already cliches by Wodd
War n. "A Nest-Egg Approach to The Public Lands," in Dysart and
Clawson, eds,

Mana~in~

Public Lands in the Public Interest. New York,

Praeger, 1988, at 87.
2. Neslon: "Public land management is ripe for a new paradigm
today." "Government as Theater: Toward a New Paradigm for the Public
Lands," 65 University of Colorado Law Rev. 335 (1994).
IV. Paradigm Found?
A. The current advocacy around the general topic "ecosystem
management" appears to me to best understood as another step on
Kaufman's cycle. We are, the model predicts, heading for a new wave of
science.
1. The environmentalists having opened up the process to let
themselves in, now see infidels claiming a place at the table.
2. The result is both the vilification of many types of publics who
wish to become involved and--just what Kaufman would predict--a
reembrace of non-partisan technical competence.
3. The federal agencies, never pleased by the advent of a
consultative, brokered approach to public land management augured by the
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public involvement era, is now happily embracing the expertise and data
based ecosystem management. Surprise!
4. The old conservationist, anti-local elite reasserts itself--having
been at loggerheads for several decades, the agency and the
environmentalists see their mutual advantage in the reembrace of science.
5. The agencies can perhaps take some comfort in the fact that its
stock in trade, progressive era science, is, according to this analysis,
coming back in fashion. However, both they, and the affected interest
groups are riding an entirely different tiger.
6. How is it different
i. The federal government is no longer the federal
government of yore.
--capabilities of the states and localities are radically enhanced
--money is not available to buy local compliance
--landscape level is not the same as land ownership level;
federal agencies will have to cooperate
--now we have local environmental groups, the
environmentalist agenda is changing
ii. Science is not the Science of Yore
--Scientific truth is not what it used to be--Peet and Watts,
"Development Theory and Environment in an Age of
14

Market Triumphalism." [Special issue on Environment and
Development] 69 Economic Geography 227 (1993).
--data is radically democratized
--real ecological insight is non-existent and expensive
-- very strong process on the books for challenging bogus science
Conclusion: just as the public involvement era was not a perfect replication
of Jacksonian democracy, so too the second wave of science will not
merely reenact the progressive era.
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